Meeting March 23, 2016

Note

This workspace, or indeed the whole website, serves as an experiment of just how extensive---and public!---my mind can be. On the right the list of literature I want to look at first. Currently thinking of placing my focus on either memory or perception. Both have nice technological enhancements to delve into at a later stage (e.g., Google Glass, though new holographic glasses would be interesting too.).

Time to eat now, will extend this more later. Need to integrate the stuff by Silberstein but unsure yet what articles would be good (this or this?).

For now, departing from and .
















Wheeler, M. (2015). The revolution will not be optimised: Radical enactivism, extended functionalism and the extensive mind. Topoi, 1–16. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-015-9356-x

References

Greif, H. (2017). What is the extension of the extended mind? Synthese, 194(11), 4311–4336. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0799-9
Colombetti, G. (2015). Enactive affectivity, extended. Topoi. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-015-9335-2
Myin, E., & Zahidi, K. (2015). The extent of memory. From extended to extensive mind. In D. Moyal-Sharrock, V. Munz, & A. Coliva (Eds.), Mind, Language and Action. Berlin, München, Boston: De Gruyter. Retrieved from http://www.degruyter.com/view/books/9783110378795/9783110378795.391/9783110378795.391.xml
Loader, P. (2013). Is my memory an extended notebook? Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 4(1), 167–184. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-012-0123-2
Bechtel, W. (2012). Mental mechanisms: Philosophical perspectives on cognitive neuroscience. Taylor and Francis. Retrieved from http://doi.org/10.4324/9780203810095
Sterelny, K. (2010). Minds: Extended or scaffolded? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 9(4), 465–481. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-010-9174-y
Rupert, R. D. (2010). Representation in extended cognitive systems: Does the scaffolding of language extend the mind? In R. Menary (Ed.), The extended mind (pp. 325–353). MIT Press. Retrieved from http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?eid=2-s2.0-79951981733&partnerID=40&md5=9f1d2b4785eec3adfdb8a7ea27c16711
Wheeler, M. (2010). In defense of extended functionalism. In R. Menary (Ed.), The extended mind (pp. 245–270). MIT Press. Retrieved from http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?eid=2-s2.0-84894920548&partnerID=40&md5=fc8b923d91d10e019269e696182b6a2d
Clark, A. (2010). Memento’s revenge: The extended mind, extended. In R. Menary (Ed.), The extended mind (pp. 43–66). MIT Press. Retrieved from http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?eid=2-s2.0-84895045563&partnerID=40&md5=a4f49f47a414ff9efe206fd3937fedc4
Kiverstein, J., & Clark, A. (2009). Introduction: Mind embodied, embedded, enacted: One church or many? Topoi, 28(1), 1–7. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-008-9041-4
Rowlands, M. (2009). Enactivism and the extended mind. Topoi, 28(1), 53–62. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-008-9046-z
Di Paolo, E. (2009). Extended life. Topoi, 28(1), 9–21. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-008-9042-3
Clark, A., & Chalmers, D. (1998). The extended mind. Analysis, 58(1), 7–19. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8284.00096