

Who we are

The 2017 APPC Committee is made up of Elese Dowden (Chair), Michael Vincent (Treasurer), Sameema Zahra (Programmes Officer), Riccardo Carli (Publications Officer), Grace Campbell (PR Officer), Hora Zabbarjadi Sar and George Nguyen (General Officers).

Big thanks to Judy King, Kate Diserens, Leah Carr, Charly McIntyre, and everyone at the School of Historical and Philosophical Inquiry for helping to make this event happen.

Contact Us


Email | 2017appc@gmail.com

Web | www.hapi.uq.edu.au/2017-australasian-postgraduate-philosophy-conference

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Australasian Postgraduate Philosophy Conference 2017



School of Historical and Philosophical Inquiry
University of Queensland



School of Historical and Philosophical Inquiry
University of Queensland
Brisbane, QLD

Conference Venue

A detailed map can be found at maps.uq.edu.au/st-lucia, or alternatively, most of the buildings are on Google maps if you are looking for directions. There is also a UQNav app available at www.uq.edu.au/uqnav/ which is very useful in getting around campus. Most of the sessions are being held at the Forgan Smith building, which is one of the central buildings on Campus leading onto the Great Court. If you are coming from the CBD, Toowong, St Lucia or surrounding suburbs, the best route is via the buses that go from Chancellor's Place. If you are coming from West End or the other side of the river, ferries and buses are easier to catch from the UQ Lakes bus station or ferry terminal on the other side of campus. You can plan your trip with the Journey Planner.



Internet Access

If you are from another educational institution (anywhere in the world), you may find that eduroam connects automatically at the University of Queensland.

Alternatively, more information about access to WiFi is available at <https://its.uq.edu.au/visitor>.

Catering and Conference Dinner

There will be morning and afternoon tea provided on the Friday and the Sunday, with morning tea and a light lunch on Saturday. This will be set up near the registration desk in the Forgan Smith. Fresh fruit, coffee, tea and other assorted snacks will be available.



There are many venues around campus to purchase lunch or other snacks – **Merlo**, for example, is in the corner of the Forgan Smith building where umbrellas are set up, which you can see from anywhere in the Great Court. You will find Merlo two-for-one coffee vouchers at the registration table, so make a friend and buy them a coffee!

The conference dinner will be held at **Saint Lucy Caffé e Cucina** which is located towards the river near the UQ tennis courts and gymnasium. If you have not registered for the dinner prior to the event, you may be able to organize a last-minute booking by emailing 2017appc@gmail.com.

Accessibility

An accessibility map is available at <https://www.pf.uq.edu.au/maps/access/01Access-StLucia.pdf>. There is also a lift

to get to the third level of the Forgan Smith near the entrance to the building off the great court. Further information is also available at <http://www.uq.edu.au/student-services/disability>.

Accommodation

If you wish to stay on-campus, there are a limited number of rooms at good rates available at the UQ Women's College, which is a short walk from the Forgan Smith building. To book this, see the form at the APPC website. Alternatively, there are plenty of AirBNBs in St Lucia, Toowong, and Taringa, which are all close to the University. There are also many good hostels around the city, most of which are close to public transport to the University. There may be a very limited amount of billeting available too. For enquiries or emergency accommodation, email 2017appc@gmail.com.



Transport

You may wish to get a Go Card, which is Brisbane's equivalent of an Oyster, Hop, MyKi, or Opal public transport card. Some public transport will take cash, but it is easier and safer to purchase a Go Card, which can also be used for airport trains.


Go Cards are available from machines on campus at Chancellor's Place or UQ Lakes stations, or at the Campus News newsagent. For other locations around the city, see the map at <https://translink.com.au/tickets-and-fares/go-card/locations>.

To get to the Brisbane CBD from the domestic or international airport terminals via public transport, follow the signs for the train and get off at Roma Street or Central for city stops, then take a bus to St Lucia. The 412 departs for St Lucia and the University from Roma Street. This bus also returns to the CBD from Chancellor's Place every ten minutes or so during business hours.

To get to Brisbane CBD or St Lucia by taxi or Uber, follow the signs at the domestic and international terminals for the taxi rank or for the pre-booked or chartered transport. Ubers go from one designated location at both airports, and it costs around \$30-\$40 AUD for an Uber to the city. More information is available here: https://www.bne.com.au/sites/all/files/content/files/FAQ-Pre-Booked_and_Ride_Booking_Pick_Up_Zone.pdf.

Safety & Medical

In case of emergency, call 000 from any phone. For non-urgent medical help, the St Lucia Health Service is located at Level One of the Gordon Greenwood Building. If there is an emergency on campus and you need security, you can phone UQ Campus security on 3365 3333. They are also trained in mental health emergencies. If you would like someone to walk you to public transport or to your car after dark, UQ Unisafe Escorts are available too. More information is available at <https://www.pf.uq.edu.au/unisafe/escorts.html>.



Conference Events

FRIDAY

The registration table will be open for most of the conference, but opens at 9am on Friday. Conference streams 1A, 1B, 1C, 2A, 2B & 2C run from 12pm-5pm, with a public plenary at 4pm on the Friday by Karen Jones. We will likely go to Merlo or the Pizza Cafe after this for drinks - stay updated by joining the APPC Facebook group or Twitter page.


SATURDAY

Saturday is a packed day with sessions 3A, 3B, 3C, 4A, 4B and 4C from 9am-1:30pm. After a light lunch, we move to John Carrierio's talk on Spinoza at 2:30pm, followed by the Interdisciplinary Panel event with Assoc. Prof Marguerite La Caze, Dr Adam La Caze and Mr Ted Shear. The conference dinner begins at St Lucy's at 6pm.

SUNDAY

Sunday morning kicks off at 9am with the AGM, then at 10:30am we have a talk by Fred D'Agostino. After lunch, sessions 5A and 5B run concurrent with a publishing workshop, followed by final sessions 6A, 6B, and 6C.

Map of the University



Conference Abstracts

SESSION ONE: 12:00-14:00 FRIDAY 24TH NOVEMBER

Session 1A

Immanuel Kant And the Universal Republic: Then and Now

Aleksandar Radaković

The University of Auckland

In political philosophy, most notable problem of the world divided into separate states is encapsulated in the theory of political realism. In the context of international relations, political realism is primarily characterized by the human condition of selfishness, perpetual quest for power of individual states, and the absence of international government. Asking a simple but philosophically significant question: why is there more than one state, a high-ranking 18th-century Jacobin Anacharsis Cloots captured the concerns over plurality of self-interested sovereign states. He maintained that the social contract theory, by its own logic, results in a creation of a world-state and that all individuals should unite and form one universal republic. Cloots' idea was that a plurality of states represents a state of nature on a global level, and that states should be coerced into forming a world republic. Although Kant endorsed the principle of lawful coercion of individuals to form a civil state and leave the state of nature, he did not think the same principle should be applied on an international level. Much has changed in the course of two centuries, especially concerning the degree of interconnectedness/dependence of political communities. I will analyse whether Kant's theoretical arguments equally apply in the contemporary world of globalized politics, economy, and security threats.

Resolving the Non-Worseness Claims Defense of Sweatshop Exploitation

Alastair James

University of Melbourne

A significant defense of sweatshop exploitation – which challenges the intuition that paradigmatic cases of sweatshop exploitation are wrongfully exploitative – has been put forward by proponents of the Non-Worseness Claim (NWC). Most associated with this line of reasoning is Matt Zwolinski. Adapted from Alan Wertheimer (1996), the NWC is used to capture the moral puzzle posed by voluntary and mutually beneficial exploitative transactions between sweatshop workers and their employers. The NWC maintains that “interaction between A and B cannot be worse than non-interaction when A has a right not to interact with B at all, and when the interaction is mutually advantageous, consensual, and free from negative externalities” (Zwolinski & Wertheimer, 2016). The NWC thus consists of four conditions: i) no moral obligation to interact; ii) voluntariness; iii) mutual advantage; and iv) the absence of negative externalities. Considering all four conditions of the NWC, I aim to provide an account of how the NWC can be most effectively deflated in cases of sweatshop exploitation. Whilst its four conditions pose a definite moral puzzle for exploitation theory, challenging the NWC along consequentialist lines beyond purely transactional analysis is the most promising avenue.

A Lottocratic Choice for Resource Management

Sean Kermath

Western Michigan University

The human species has in some form or another, moral obligations to the environment. From conservation movements of the 1800's to modern climate change initiatives, it seems safe to say that most of humanity believe that, to some degree, nature is worth protecting. The question that most vexes and interests me is, given a moral obligation to nature, how best do we protect and nurture it? Currently, it seems that control of the land by the government, control of the land by corporations, or control of the land by private citizens are the most common scenarios. In turn, I intend to show that each of these are flawed systems and since we have a

moral obligation to do better and protect the land, a new system must be created and maintained. My proposal is a collective ownership of the land, one in which all citizens are co-owners of their respective nations resources and lands. 1 A modified form of lottocracy, specifically a modified form of Alexander Guerrero's single-issue lottery-selected legislatures (SILL). 2 Instead of these legislatures, each resource would be maintained by single resource lottery-selected 3 citizen's trusts (or in shorthand simply Trusts). 4 My intention is to show that this hypothetical construct is a superior method of maintaining resources and nature in a sustainable way.

Session 1B

Kicking the Akritic Off the Couch – The Shifting View of Autonomy in Self-destructive Behavior in the 19th And 20th Century

Grace Campbell

University of Queensland

In this talk, I examine the shifting position of self-destruction within a paradigm that privileges human rationality. The Enlightenment solidified the importance and privilege of human rationality and reason. When people acted counter to the wellbeing, their behavior was framed as being the result of heritable disease to be eliminated via eugenics or eugenics-like programs, the result of ignorance that was able to be remedied via large scale education programs or social change, or as the result of pleasure seeking behavior to be remedied via punishment. However, the rise of psychoanalysis and then later of modern psychiatry shifted the target of this discourse. The belief that self-destructive behavior was caused by psychological malfunction was applied to mainstream society rather than the relatively few extreme cases of previous eras. Models of heritability that were the target of eugenics movements were phased out in favor of more overarching models that saw self-destructive behavior as something to be cured. Changes in modern psychiatry post World War II further expanded this trend. The subsequent implementation of standardized nosology in mental health treatment and wide-scale epidemiology replaced individual

accounts of subjective experience of self-destruction. These changes in turn shifted the locus of autonomy from the self-destructing person to the mental health system.

The Ethical Return of Dionysus In the Late Nietzsche

Riccardo Carli

University of Queensland

This paper pursues Dionysus' traces and describes the echo of his presence in Nietzsche's moral philosophy. I will show how, during his period of absence from Nietzsche's texts, Dionysus works anyway in the shadow, acquiring a renovate theoretical power and preparing his return during the eighties. What re-emerges is a stronger Dionysus, ready to challenge Apollo's supremacy not only in the aesthetic field but also in ethics. Arguably, it is the overwhelming prevalence of an Apollinean principle of order what Nietzsche criticizes in all prescriptive ethical systems: Apollo's dominion takes the form of the illusion of a single morality, the endorsement of an undisputed system of value, and the faith in the rationalization of human behavior. For Nietzsche, these forms of morality hide a potential passivity and even reactivity, which impede a proper self-realization. My paper supports this narrative, dealing in particular with the tricky case offered by virtue ethics. Although Nietzsche has been often and quite convincingly associated with this ethical perspective, I argue that the return of Dionysus influences Nietzsche's idea of virtue as well. The study of how Nietzsche distance himself from some Ancient and Hellenistic ethical accounts, together with a careful description of Zarathustra's 'gift-giving' virtue, will show how the potential risks of virtue ethics are very similar to what already denounced against the other moral systems: in particular, an overestimation of the power of reason and a blind subordination of the individual to the community.

Session 1C

Validity as Correct Reasoning

Elizabeth Olsen

Victoria University of Wellington

The explanation from Copi's Introduction to Logic: "Logic is the study of the methods and principles used to distinguish correct from incorrect reasoning. When we reason about any matter, we produce arguments to support our conclusions. Our arguments include reasons that we think justify our beliefs. However, not all reasons are good reasons. Therefore we may always ask, when we confront an argument: Does the conclusion reached follow from the premises assumed?" encourages accepting the principle: "a logic is correct if and only if the logic validates a particular argument if and only if when the premises are true a reasoner is justified in believing the conclusion" A principle like the above effectively says that validity is correctly described by a logic when it is an accurate representation of the circumstances under which we are justified in accepting a belief. But the biconditional nature of this principle means when the premises are true and reasoner is justified in accepting a belief then, to be correct, a logic must validate that inference. This creates a basis for asserting that to be correct a logic must validate inductive argument forms – something deeply at odds with the classical validity presented in the text.

The Barbershop Paradox

Theresa Helke

Yale-NUS College and the National University of Singapore

This paper analyses Lewis Carroll's alleged counterexample to modus tollens. It focuses on the responses four theories of the indicative conditional would offer to the trilemma Carroll's argument presents. The three theses of the trilemma are: #1 the argument is invalid; #2 the argument is an instance of modus tollens; and #3 modus tollens is valid. The four theories on whose responses the paper focuses are: (i) the material theory (inspired by Grice); (ii) the possible-worlds theory (inspired

by Stalnaker and Lewis); (iii) the suppositional theory (inspired by Adams and Edgington); and (iv) the hybrid theory (inspired by Jackson). The paper shows that the paradox is alive and well. While each theory can reject at least one of the theses, the material and possible-worlds theories can't do so while still explaining the plausibility of the three – and to solve the trilemma they must. Moreover, while the suppositional and hybrid theories can reject at least one of the theses while still explaining the plausibility of the three, they face problems of their own: the suppositional view implies that conditionals are non-propositional; and the hybrid view makes a seemingly ad hoc distinction between probability and assertibility.

Vagueness and Individuation

Michael Lazarou

University of Adelaide

Peter Unger's "Problem of the Many" (1980) arises whenever there is an object with fuzzy or indeterminate spatial boundaries. Roughly, where we should expect one boundary for an object; such as a mountain, cat, or table, we instead find many candidate boundaries for these objects, each with an equally good claim for being the single correct boundary. What we lack in these cases is a means of individuating one object from many, what Unger calls a "selection principle". My talk will offer such a selection principle. This will be based on an account of "worldly" or non-representational vagueness. More specifically, I will defend the thesis that vague objects exist, and that these objects can be individuated in cases involving the problem of the many. Finally, I will consider whether commitment to the existence of vague objects flouts well-established principles in classical logic and standard mereology.

SESSION TWO: 15:00-17:30 FRIDAY 24TH NOVEMBER

Session 2A

Debunking Arguments and Evidence of Epistemic Failure

Yeo Shang

Australian National University

You have some moral beliefs. What, if anything, could you learn about the causes of these beliefs such that you rationally ought to reduce confidence in them, or jettison them altogether? Some philosophers have argued that evidence from evolutionary psychology shows our moral beliefs to be epistemically problematic, hence we ought to reduce confidence in those beliefs. That is, they take the evidence to supply grounds for a *debunking argument* against our moral beliefs. What kind of empirical evidence is needed for supporting allegations of epistemic failure? And does the current evolutionary evidence warrant a reduction in confidence? In this paper, I hope to explore what it takes to produce a debunking argument, and the different factors that affect its strength. I also hope to make a tentative case that the current evidence from evolutionary psychology at best supports a weak debunking argument.

The Otiosity of the Evolutionary Debunking Argument

Oscar Davis

Bond University

In this paper, I explore the viability of the evolutionary debunking arguments against moral realism. I argue that most forms of the debunking claim are argumentatively otiose. Employing a distinction by Kahane (2011) between post-hoc justification and post-hoc rationalization, I argue that evolutionary debunking of moral realism presuppose that philosophical defenses of moral realism are rationalizations rather than justifications. Verifying this presupposition requires engaging in, and winning, philosophical argument with moral realists. To use claims about evolution to debunk moral realism, therefore, one must have already won the philosophical argument with moral realists. The debunking move is therefore otiose.

Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and Moral Naturalism

Matthew Ringenbergs

Monash University

Evolutionary Debunking Arguments (EDAs) attempt to undermine our justification in believing a particular belief or set of beliefs from the fact that the belief or set of beliefs in question are the result of evolutionary processes. The EDA against moral realism attempts to show that our moral beliefs are likely the result of an evolutionary process that would be insensitive to moral truth (that is the process would be “off-track”), and thus it would be a huge coincidence for our ordinary moral beliefs to be true, undermining our justification for accepting those moral beliefs. However, the debunking force of these EDAs is undercut if the moral can be reduced to the natural, in such a case it would be no coincidence that we evolved to track true moral facts. Proponents of EDAs, such as Joyce (2006) and Street (2006), argue that no moral naturalist can provide the right account. The aim of this paper is to examine and evaluate the constraints placed on the moral naturalist by Joyce and Street, and further examine several promising naturalist theories and evaluate whether any of them are able to satisfy such constraints.

Session 2B

A Husserlian Analysis of The Horizon-structure Of Experience in Case Of ‘Hermeneutical Injustice’ And ‘Epistemic Marginalization’

Hora Zabarjadi Sar

University of Queensland

The notion of epistemic injustice, developed by Miranda Fricker (2007), is a situation in which the social experiences of the powerless are not probably integrated into collective understandings of the social world, and as result that specific group are unfairly disadvantaged as participants in a collective

form of life. But in its very core, both types of epistemic injustice, testimonial and hermeneutic injustice, have identity-constructive power in common. This paper aims to analyze the fundamental structure of experience of hermeneutical harm. Drawing upon Husserl's (1973) phenomenological notion of 'horizon-structure of experience' or perception and its intersubjective status, I intend to explain how 'the subject of social understanding' as a participant of a shared world-horizon requires an orientation, in order to thematise the world itself as a life-world for herself. This orientation is the outcome of the intersubjective triangulation of self-other and the world. In other words, it is the contents and meanings of our experience that represent things around us, all extant in space and time. Doing so, I can reflect more explicitly on Fricker's suggestion, on how hermeneutical injustice is considered as a 'harm in one's essential attributes of personhood' (Fricker, 2007, p.58). In this manner, epistemic fairness is not just a virtue, but intrinsically is 'a priori' for the existential and ontological constitution of subjectivity at a transcendental intersubjective level.

Risking Life Vs. Giving Life: Revisiting Simone De Beauvoir

Sameema Zahra

University of Queensland

"...it is not in giving life but in risking life that man raises himself above the animal; this is why throughout humanity, superiority has been granted not to the sex that gives birth, but to the one that kills." (Beauvoir, 2011, 76) Beauvoir calls it the key to understanding female oppression; that she is the sex that gives life and not the one that risks and superiority lies with the latter. The reason behind this is that superiority is granted on the basis of values in the human realm and not on the grounds of service to the species. The question is how are values given in the human realm; what is valued more and why? Beauvoir's answer is through the concept of risk. It is through risk that values are created because risk leads to transcendence. But what do we mean by risk? Can any kind of risk create values? Or does

risk involve risking something fundamental to life or maybe life itself? Above all are there multiple ways of taking risk and are they all equally capable of bringing transcendence? I will discuss what entitles any action to be counted as risk and why, according to Simone de Beauvoir, motherhood or giving life is excluded from the realm of risk. It will question this exclusion and ask if there is any possible way in which motherhood can be lived as a risk? I will argue that in a non-patriarchal society motherhood can become a choice and can create values and thus be equated with risk.

Diversity, Commonalities and The Struggle Against Oppression: Thinking About Collective Action Through Simone De Beauvoir's Theory of Freedom

Kelly Beck

University of Queensland

Simone de Beauvoir's analysis of the oppression of women in *The Second Sex* is grounded in a concept of freedom rooted in existentialist philosophy. Beauvoir is therefore committed to the belief that every individual is ontologically free. However, Beauvoir's concept of freedom is distinct (from Sartre, for example) in that she argues that access to the expression of ontological freedom is contingent upon how the individual is situated concretely in relation to their community. For Beauvoir, the community exerts its constraints upon individuals differently; nevertheless she argues that the individual also has a responsibility to express their ontological freedom in the service of freedom to others. A part of that responsibility involves a commitment to ensuring freedom is directed towards securing an open future. In recognizing that commonalities as well as differences

exist between women of diverse situations, this paper asks how Beauvoir's theory of freedom can be used to conceptualize collective action amongst women when diversity is recognized as the starting point for such action. How might a struggle against oppression towards an open future be thought about in concrete terms in this case?

Session 2C

ABC and Relativity

George Nguyen

University of Queensland

The well-known Rietdijk–Putnam argument shows that presentism is incompatible with special relativity due to the latter's rejection of absolute simultaneity. This argument can be extended to the cases of the A-, B-, and C-theories of time. I show that all series-based theories of time are incompatible with special relativity because they all require an absolute ordering of events. This conclusion presents a dilemma for philosophers of time: either give up compatibility with special relativity as a desideratum for temporal ontology, or give up seriality as a global property of time. I outline some ways forward for accepting either horn of the dilemma.

Can We Know That It Is Now, Now?

Naoyuki Kajimoto

University of Sydney

In "How do we know it is now now", David Braddon-Mitchell presents an influential "now-now" objection against non-presentist A-theories. This argument can be formulated as follows.

Now-Now Objection

1. A non-presentist A-theory is true. That is, there is an objective present and non-present times exist.
2. If a non-presentist A-theory is true, then one cannot detect whether one is in the objective present or the objective non-present.
3. If (2), then one ought conclude that one is not in the objective present given that there are very many more objectively non-present times than objectively present times.

4. Therefore, one ought not believe one is in the objective present.

If this now-now objection is right, then we should give up non-presentist A-theories. In this paper, I will examine some recent responses from non-presentist A-theorists and consider the prospects of their responses.

McTaggart's Paradox Is Problematic for All A-theories Of Time: Let Me Tell You Why

Dr. Talia Sellars

The University of Auckland

To set the scene, I will first explain what McTaggart's Paradox is, and why it is problematic for A-theories of time (theories which take there to be an objective moving NOW, and which order the moments of time in terms of that NOW). I will then explain what I call the "obvious" solution to McTaggart's paradox, and why that solution results in an infinite regress. What I then want to show is that all A-theories face the paradox, and all attempts to solve the paradox result in the infinite regress. Clearly, I will not have time to discuss every single A-theory or every attempt at avoiding the problem, but it should become clear that all attempts to save the A-theory are analogous. If one thinks that the infinite regress is vicious (and I do), then one should find McTaggart's century old argument enough to give us a reductio-ad-absurdum of McTaggart's A-theory, as well as any modern day A-theoretic views.

SESSION THREE: 09:00-11:00 SATURDAY 25TH NOVEMBER

Session 3A

The Ethical Framework of Principlism In Determining Responsibilities of Pharmacists Selling Complementary Medicines

Amber Salman Popattia

The University of Queensland

Research regarding pharmacists' responsibilities when selling complementary medicines consists predominantly of empirical studies. The limited literature explicitly discussing the ethics of selling complementary medicines identify the conflicting principles in play related to the sale of complementary medicines, for instance, the conflict between respecting consumer autonomy and providing evidence-based care. Explicit normative advice on how to resolve such conflicts is not provided. The implicit framework employed in the pharmacy literature employs the principles of bioethics. This paper aims to examine principlism as an approach for determining pharmacists' responsibilities when selling complementary medicines. Principlism is typically criticized on the basis of its theoretical foundations and its ability to provide practical guidance regarding resolving conflicts. It is common in healthcare to accept these criticisms and employ principlism as a form of 'ethics first-aid': a way to identify conflicts without any attempt to resolve them. I argue against this approach. I identify key developments within principlism and describe how developments such as basing the principles in common morality, employing reflective equilibrium and specified principlism provide the necessary theoretical resources for determining pharmacist's responsibilities when selling complementary medicines. This work provides the basis for a more informed discussion of pharmacist responsibilities when selling complementary medicines.

Mercy, Mercy Killing and Euthanasia

Bryanna Moore

Monash University

Children's Bioethics Centre (Royal Children's Hospital)

Reference to mercy killing permeates the discourse on euthanasia. Yet, surprisingly, the nature of medical mercy itself is rarely the focus of philosophical inquiry. In my paper I explore the relationship between the concepts of mercy and mercy killing, and how they apply to medicine and

euthanasia. In the context of end of life care, mercy killing has conventionally been treated as synonymous with euthanasia. I wish to challenge this conventional understanding. My primary contentions in this paper are: firstly, that merciful acts, unlike acts of euthanasia, are not tied to a particular motive; secondly, that mercy is a supererogatory virtue that involves a retributive element of wrongdoing or accountability on behalf of the recipient that we are rarely willing to ascribe to the seriously ill and suffering patient; thirdly, that mercy's retributive, supererogatory nature renders it a poor clinical decision-making tool; and finally, that what is actually meant by reference to mercy and mercy killing in medicine is medical compassion, due to the undeserved nature of the suffering produced by serious illness.

Virtue Ethics and Sexual Fantasy: Misrepresentation in Moral Attribution

Mitch Alexander and Elka Sadler

Monash University

In his forthcoming paper "Rape, Robots and Representation", Dr Robert Sparrow makes three claims against the moral acceptability of hypothetical "rapebots" - sex robots designed to simulate "rape" by struggling against their use. These claims are broadly defined as empirical, social and personal; the last of which uses Virtue Ethics to determine that the design and use of "rapebots" would be unethical. In this presentation we will argue that Sparrow's use of Virtue Ethics is problematic. First, Sparrow's claim that "repeated enjoyment from the continual use of a rapebot shows the agent to be cruel and vicious"; is made without recourse to the reasons an agent may use a rapebot. We argue that intentions are better indicators of vice and virtue than actions. Thus, attending to an agent's reasons for acting can undermine Sparrow's claim that any participation in a representation of rape is necessarily "cruel and vicious." This leads to our second point; if the use and enjoyment of a rapebot does not necessarily prove an agent to be vicious in character, then Sparrow's argument not

only mistakenly identifies right acting agents as vicious, it also sets up Virtue Ethics as counter-purposive to describing non-viceful human behaviour.

Session 3B

Love Letters in Class: The Way of Love in The Schools?

Nathan Pickels

The University of Queensland

In this presentation I engage with Larrosa's worry that education is "in constant tension with its own corruption, which is to say, it must confront the many faces of Herod..." (Larrosa, 2017, p. 155). I make a case for agreeing with the statement and look to ways in which might provide support for education against the specific, yet central, corruption that has thinking reduced to mere learning. Herod, in this case, takes the form of a system of technocratic reproduction (and, as I will argue reduction) whereby students are sacrificed without question to the powers and conceits of the already-existing world. I pose Luce Irigaray's conception of love as a mediating concept between an education that actively lets students think and a mere learning/schooling. My main aim is to show how love (as an ethic of non-appropriation) might allow us to open students to the existing world without enacting a violent tearing away from their own.

Philosophy in Schools

Ben Kilby

University of Melbourne

Philosophy in primary schools is a niche subject area with very few schools teaching any philosophy at all. Given the vast array of benefits to children that have been reported in empirical studies, as well as in anecdotal reports by teachers, philosophy deserves a more central focus in our primary

schools. This research project aims to develop an understanding of how primary school teachers who are new to the practices of Philosophy for Children interpret and implement it in their classrooms. A hermeneutic phenomenological research methodology will be used to analyze data from these teachers which will provide insight into their beliefs, motivations, values, assumptions, understanding, and interpretation of Philosophy for Children in their primary school classrooms. The results of this project may help to create stronger links between the development of Philosophy for Children in the academic sphere and Philosophy for Children that is happening in classrooms.

Session 3C

'Ought'-Concepts In 'Is'-Disciplines

Michael Vincent

University of Queensland

A friend and I want to know when people will see their past behaviour as a model for how to behave in future ('moral consistency'), and when they will see it as a reason to act differently ('moral balancing'). Both of these effects have been observed across study cohorts, but they are inconsistent with each other, so seem to only arise under particular conditions. A problem for identifying these conditions is that the psychological literature uses such bland concepts: comparing 'good' acts to 'bad' acts, for example. There is a much richer language for discussing moral decision-making available in philosophy departments – but to what extent could that be of use in discussing the behaviour of people who don't have a philosophical theory underlying their decisions? My talk is about an attempt to fruitfully bridge some disciplinary boundaries. So, I will have a bit to say about the specific project on moral psychology and behavioral economics, and something broader about the use of concepts from philosophy in other disciplines.

Why Intuitions Matter

Nathaniel Gan

The University of Sydney

Appeals to intuition in philosophy have drawn a mixed response: some philosophers freely avail themselves of thought experiments in their arguments; others are suspicious of how much can be inferred from our intuitions, while experimental philosophy moreover seems to show how unstable our intuitions can be. These doubts should cause us to consider what appeals to intuition consist in, and why they are justified. In this paper I discuss the role that intuitions play in philosophy and defend the view that intuitions are evidence. First I survey examples of arguments in philosophy wherein intuitions and theory interact, from which observations are made about how intuitions are used. Then I describe how ordinary evidence works, and show that intuitions behave as does evidence. I also consider the doubts that have been raised regarding appeals to intuition, and show that these doubts do not hinder the role intuitions play as evidence. Finally I examine thought experiments in science and mathematics to show that intuitions are evidence even outside of philosophy. I conclude that, although bare appeals to intuition are unjustified, intuitions nevertheless play a significant role in our theorizing.

A Critique of Elliott Sober's Characterization of Inclusive Fitness

Derek Halm and Dr. David Wyss Rudge

Western Michigan University

This paper will offer an outline of the concept of fitness in the philosophy of biology leading into a criticism of Elliott Sober's view of inclusive fitness. First, I will describe inclusive fitness and the motivations behind its continued usage. Second, Sober's critique of inclusive fitness, and his subsequent articulation of how we should consider fitness holistically, will be offered. Third, I will hope to show that Sober's presentation of inclusive fitness does not properly characterize the different ways that scientists use

the term in their work. Ultimately, my conclusion is that inclusive fitness need not be the only way to consider fitness, but its continual success justifies itself instrumentally within the sciences. Sober's argument towards holism will, ultimately, justify my conclusion against his view.

SESSION FOUR: 11:30-13:30 SATURDAY 25TH NOVEMBER

Session 4A

Failure of Consequentialism

Alex, Cui Zizai

Hwa Chong Institution

This paper provides theoretical grounding for the cluelessness challenge in agent-affecting cases raised by Lenman (2001), and generates a more general challenge which all its critiques to date fail to address. (Dorsey 2011, Cowen 2006, Burchbrown 2014) I begin by establishing two conditions for normative ethical systems: C1(Potency): ethical systems which provide no guidance to decision making fail by being impotent

C2(Justification): ethical systems fail when they allow logically inconsistent or irresponsible acts.

Subsequently, I identify two necessary premises of consequentialism:

P1(metaphysical): in the long run, the impact of any act is either determinately good or bad.

P2(epistemic): whether the act is decidedly good or bad, is accessible to the agent.

Examining all possibilities of each premise against the two conditions, I argue that no variant of consequentialism satisfies both, and hence consequentialism fails definitively.

Location, Location, Location: Not the Right Property for Infinite Ethics

Hayden Wilkinson

Australian National University

In decision theory, cases of infinite value are notoriously problematic [Pascal 1670; Bernoulli 1738; Nover and Hájek 2004]. How fortunate that we do not face such cases in ethics! Alas, we do – according to modern cosmology, our universe is infinite [Guth 2000; Knobe et al. 2006], with infinite total value no matter our actions [Nelson 1991; Smith 2003; Bostrom 2011]. If we are standard consequentialists, then our every choice is an infinite decision problem. But not all hope is lost. Several promising solutions exist, including: expansionism, bounded domains, discounting, and value densities. Each one escapes the problem by considering not just total value but also the locations at which value occurs. However, their use of locational information is problematic when we consider special relativity. Each approach entails a trilemma, whereby we must accept: that moral judgements can change with speed; that many actions are neither permissible nor impermissible; or that our moral preferences be intransitive, such that we could permissibly make the world strictly worse. None of these options make for a viable moral theory, so none of those approaches provide a viable solution. Locational information does not seem to help us avoid our problem of infinite moral value.

Defense of Honor Is Not a Just Cause for War

Kieran McInerney

University of Melbourne

My talk will focus on the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion in Just War Theory. More specifically, it will criticize Statman's influential reformulation of this principle. Statman tentatively proposed the 'Honor Solution' to deal with widespread intuitions that are troubling for the

Reasonable Probability of Success criterion. I will assert five problems with Statman's remedy, which has gained traction in contemporary Just War Theory. These are: that without a temporal restriction it is too permissive, that it renders the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion redundant, that the honor code asserted is counter-intuitive (and further that the concept of honor itself is rightfully considered outdated), that the concept of honor is too ambiguous to function in the role that he assigns to it, and that Statman fails to establish that the successful defense of honor ought to morally permit a state to resort to war.

Session 4B

Disability and The Imperative of Inclusion

Brigid Evans

University of Melbourne

Over the last twenty years, governments throughout the world have shared a concern for integration of disabled and non-disabled students. Schools have increasingly moved to desegregate the education of disabled students through inclusion policies. In academic political philosophy, there is currently much enthusiasm surrounding the development of integration as a requirement of social justice. Applications of this concept to educational policy already exist, but have been centered on overcoming racial and/or economic segregation. The idea of integration as a moral ideal is yet to be fully tested with respect to the situation of disabled students, a small group with complex and diverse educational needs. This paper fills this gap and corrects what otherwise risks being a naïve application of an otherwise promising theoretical ideal to an important area of practice.

Can Identity Prejudice Raise Epistemic Standards?

William Tuckwell

University of Melbourne

The notion of identity prejudice is front and center of Miranda Fricker's account of testimonial injustice. Simplifying a little, testimonial injustice occurs when a speaker, S, knows that p, testifies that p, but S's audience does not treat S as knowing that p because the audience is prejudiced against the speaker on the basis of their social identity, and S is harmed as a result. In this paper I explore the possibility that epistemic standards can be cranked up in a way that puts knowledge out of reach of the testifier through the exercise of an audience's identity prejudice. A consequence of this is that if S ceases to know once the epistemic standards are raised then S no longer suffers from testimonial injustice; that which causes testimonial injustice can be manipulated to prevent it. I will suggest that this counter-intuitive result is particularly troubling for shifty epistemologies, i.e., those views on which the standards for knowledge shift as particular error possibilities are made salient or as practical stakes rise. Two views that I will consider that are shifty in this way are contextualism and subject-sensitive invariantism.

Session 4C

Can We Afford a New Approach to The Virtual Memory Palace?

Anco Peeters and Miguel Segundo-Ortin

University of Wollongong

Even though the memory palace technique has been around for millennia and has proven to be a powerful way of remembering, it faces two problems. First, cognitive scientists are currently unable to explain why it works so well. Second, the technique faces significant practical challenges to its users: they need to have access to a suitable training environment and have lots of time in order to practice the technique. Virtual reality devices are sometimes presented as a way to face these practical challenges, but currently fall short of delivering on that promise. We aim to address both issues in this talk. First, we argue that an enactive-ecological

approach to memory can help us understand the effectiveness of memory palaces as an embodied technique. Second, we present design recommendations from an enactive-ecological perspective for those virtual reality devices that aim to support the memory palace technique -- our prediction is that this will help the effectiveness of such devices.

S-representation And the Emulator Theory: A Match Made in Heaven?

Matt Nestor

University of Adelaide

Structural representation (or s-representation) is an increasingly popular approach to mental representation. Proponents of this view typically distinguish the *content* of a representation from the *target*. Very roughly, we can think of the target as the thing that a representation is 'pointed at'—the thing we are 'trying' to represent—whereas the content is what is 'said' about the target. We then get misrepresentation if we 'say' something that is not true of the target. What unifies theories of s-representation is the claim that mental content is grounded in *structural similarity*. However, to date, there is no generally accepted approach to target fixation. In other news, Rick Grush has recently used the machinery of *control theory* to defend what he calls the *emulator theory of representation* (ETR). According to Grush, something only qualifies as a vehicle of representation if it is an emulator embedded in a larger control system. I think that s-representation and ETR could greatly benefit from one another. The purpose of this talk is thus twofold: First, I argue that the theory of content Grush wants to defend can be more precisely characterized under the s-representation framework. Second, I use Grush's ETR to sketch an account of target fixation, thus filling in the missing link in a theory of s-representation.

An Answer to The Extended Knowledge Dilemma

Gloria Andrada

Autonomous University of Madrid

Macquarie University

In his 2015 paper, Andy Clark highlights a dilemma concerning the epistemological consequences of Extended Cognition: the better something looks as a non-biological element of the machinery of mind, the worse it looks as a potential object of any specifically epistemic skill or ability on the part of the agent. His answer lies on sub-personal forms of epistemic hygiene. In this presentation, I offer a different answer to the dilemma, drawing from Integrationist approaches to the mind (Menary, 2010, 2012) and virtue epistemology. Epistemic Hygiene is acquired by integrating cognitive practices (a subset of socio-cultural practices that work as patterns for action) and those practices make demands on the agent in order to achieve knowledge. I explain how this delicate interplay between agent and cultural unfolds and why the dilemma is not problematic under such an approach.

SESSION FIVE: 13:00-15:00 SUNDAY 26TH NOVEMBER

Session 5A

Equipping the Moral Technocrat: Approaches to Moral Steering

James McGuire

Monash University

A *moral technocrat* is an agent who operationalizes insights from the social sciences to steer or guide the moral behavior of individuals in their local circles. A common-sense way of understanding 'steering' in this context is to view it as a fundamentally active and direct act: the moral technocrat introduces or applies some situational feature to the physical environment (e.g. a pleasant fragrance) or to the individual (e.g. verbal encouragement)

to elicit morally good behavior. Someone interested in the promotion—or preservation—of moral and prosocial norms of conduct should endeavor to explore other broad strategies geared towards guiding behavior. In this paper I motivate and sketch two broad additional proposals for the moral technocrat to consider. The first is a fundamentally passive approach by which the technocrat consciously restricts their own conduct so as to avoid introducing or contributing to—and thereby exacerbating—situational features that may encourage wrongdoing. The second is a fundamentally preventive approach that focuses on mitigating the potential influence of an already present situational feature which may incite wrongdoing.

The Moral Content of Some Personality Disorders; Revising the Blame, Not the Responsibility

Roohollah Haghshenas

University of Tehran

Moral practices are our moral reactions to those we hold them the participants. Mental disorders can be significant for our moral practices when they can provide good reasons for excusing or exempting from worthiness to many moral reactions like blame. At least some personality disorders cannot provide such reasons. Still, we may have good reasons against some salient parts of our ordinary moral reactions to them. To see how it can be possible, Hanna Pickard's theory of "responsibility without blame" is a major work, and one of the few. In my examining this theory, I show it needs to say more about how personality disorders should be

seen exceptional, or to extend it for many other "bad" persons that cannot satisfy diagnose criteria for a personality disorder. I argue for the second option. To do this, I try first to see how our "order" of valuing works and how it depends on a long-life process of reflective modification. I show how some dysfunctions can occur within our practices of valuing and make it "disordered". Finally, I try to argue for a set of reactive attitudes consisted of Pickard's revisions for blaming together with some other underestimated moral reactions like moral sadness.

Blame When You'd Do the Same? Responsibility and Obedience to Authority

Adam Piovarchy

University of Sydney

Milgram's (1963) Obedience to Authority experiments have shown that 65% of people will electrocute a stranger to death when instructed to do so by an authority figure. Most philosophers agree subjects in these settings are morally responsible for their actions. This paper will argue for two conclusions. First, there is empirical evidence that if minor changes were made to Milgram's setup, 95% of people would obey in such settings. As a result, the original 65% figure should not be treated as a maximum possible obedience rate, but simply the highest demonstrated rate so far. Second, observing this higher obedience rate makes it inappropriate for almost anyone in the moral community to hold the obedient subjects responsible for their actions, despite subjects still being morally responsible for their actions. This is because we lack the standing to hold someone responsible for something that we ourselves would have done.

Session 5B

Virtue Ethics, Environment and Theology

Neil Bergmann

Flinders University

My research is motivated by three observations which link Ecology, Theology and Virtue Ethics. Firstly, the Earth is facing an unprecedented ecological crisis, yet modern secular debates have been dominated by questions of fact (is climate change real?) and questions about ethically correct responses to the crisis (Paris Climate Agreement), with less emphasis on how to initiate necessary changes in individual behavior.

Secondly, theological engagement with environmental ethics has been limited, partly because Christian scripture has scant material that directly addresses Earth Care, and much of that material is ambiguous in its message. Thirdly, there has been a renewed secular interest in Virtue Ethics in recent decades because it helps overcome the unrealistic Enlightenment emphasis on reason alone as the basis for ethics. Virtue Ethics concentrates on the morally good actor rather than on morally good acts, and has a long history in Christian philosophy. This research will use Virtue Ethics as a hermeneutical framework for scriptural interpretation with an aim of identifying a set of environmentally focused virtues. For example, the traditional virtue of justice leads to an environmental virtue of eco-justice, where Earth is a common good to be shared equitably by all, now and in the future.

Aristotle On Responsibility for One's Character

Andrew Cheng-Hsin Chang

National Taiwan University, Taipei

In this paper, I consider Aristotle's discussion of our responsibility for moral character in *Nicomachean Ethics* (EN) III 5. Against the view that Aristotle holds the thesis that we are partially responsible for our character, I argue that Aristotle in fact thinks that we are fully responsible for our character. I argue that Aristotle in fact holds the thesis that no matter how our external conditions are, since we are the ones who act, we are fully responsible for the character we thereby form. In this paper I will (a) provide an interpretation of EN III5, (b) criticize the view that Aristotle thinks we are partially responsible for our character, and point out some problem this view has; (c) I argue for the thesis that Aristotle believes we are fully responsible for our character formed, and argue that my view could avoid the problems that partial responsibility thesis faces. Lastly, I (d) give an Aristotelian account of the relation between luck and responsibility, facing the objection that my view seems to make eudaimonia (human flourishing)

immune to changes out of our control, I defend that my view actually retains the fragility of eudaimonia.

SESSION SIX: 15:30-17:30 SUNDAY 26TH NOVEMBER

Session 6A

Social Norms and Meat

Lucy Mayne

Monash University

Eating meat is not generally thought of as a moral issue, and even among those who say that meat eating is wrong, strict vegetarianism is rare. In this paper, I examine the role of one's social environment, particularly social norms, in shaping meat-regarding behavior. I argue that because of the way social norms operate, giving up meat has many elements of a collective action problem. Early adopters of vegetarianism face not only practical problems, but also the risk of social sanctions, making acting early unattractive. Conversely, if there is consensus within one's reference group, meat eating can be "taken off the table" such that the costs and benefits of meat eating cease to be considered. If moral vegetarianism were widespread, eating meat would invite disesteem, thereby motivating compliance. However, as long as meat eating is widespread, it will not invite much, if any, disesteem, even from individuals who personally disapprove. Some people, however, are motivated to give up meat despite prevalent norms. Studying them can tell us something about what might motivate others, as well as about how a tipping point might be reached such that social norms come to support vegetarianism.

Rational Ignorance? Transformative Experience and The Refusal of Revelation Metaphysics?

Phillipa Malone

Monash University

In the wake of the U.S. Presidential election, and the 'Brexit' referendum in the U.K., widespread concern has arisen about individuals refusing to engage with opposing viewpoints. The 'echo-chambers' that result from self-imposed epistemic isolation are oft considered irrational. Drawing on L.A. Paul's notion of transformative experience, I will show that this assumption is unfounded. Engaging in a nuanced and charitable manner with an opposing worldview is a transformative experience. Paul claims that the only choice open to us in such circumstances is to accept, or refuse, revelation: we can either maintain our current first-order preferences, or discover a new set of preferences. As a result, agents can rationally refuse to entertain certain types of information: they can rationally choose to participate in echo chambers. This deeply counter-intuitive outcome suggests that current solutions to the problem of transformative choice are inadequate, and the problem merits further philosophical discussion.

Why Work and Spend? A Structural Explanation

Pascale Bastien

University of Melbourne

The dominant consumer lifestyle in affluent societies has been described by Juliet Schor as the work and spend cycle. Since its emergence in the second half of the 20th century, this lifestyle has either been the subject of a moralized discourse aimed at restoring certain moral values, or has been celebrated as epitomizing individual rights and freedoms. Either way, analyses of consumerism often implicitly rely on an individualistic explanation for engaging in the work and spend cycle, and therefore fail to address the structural constraints within which individuals exercise agency. In this paper, I draw on Sally Haslanger's framework to show that a structural explanation for working and spending not only provides insights into the reasons why individuals engage in the consumer lifestyle, but also

allows for a normative evaluation of the underlying structure. This has important moral and political import, since by shifting the focus from the individual to the underlying social structure, previously ignored issues of social justice may come to light, which in turn may create a space for constructive public debate regarding potential alternative social structures.

Session 6B

Understanding the Appearance of Humanity: The Necessities of Political Epistemology

Kate Diserens

University of Queensland

C.S Peirce provides the epistemology necessary for understanding the political reality of humanity that Hannah Arendt theorizes. The (re)creation of an Arendtian “world of appearances” - constituted by humanity’s self-display - is only possible if we are attentive to the epistemological concerns arising from the purpose of our inquiry. In this case our purpose is to comprehend and participate in political reality, for the sake of preserving the possibility of unprecedented and/or spontaneous thought and action. I argue that we must deploy the methodology appropriate for what Peirce calls “vital matters”, because it satisfies Arendt’s concerns about the integrity of belief when the doxastic object is inherently unpredictable, is essentially phenomenal, has a source but not a cause, and is resistant to truth claims.

Žižek’s Dialectical Materialism – The Corollaries of Immanent Transcendence

Christopher Boerdam

University of QLD

In his most recent work, especially *Less Than Nothing* (2012) and *Absolute Recoil* (2014), Slavoj Žižek has continued to refine his project of reviving a Hegelian metaphysics of dialectical materialism that meets the challenge established by German Idealism of thinking ‘subject with substance’. This metaphysics involves linking the concept of the subject as developed by German Idealism with the concept of the Freudian death drive to conceptualize the subject as that point of formal negativity that immanently transcends the symbolic and natural coordinates of its existence, rendering the world non-all. But what is the practical import of this metaphysics? To what extent can it inform a viable approach to ethical or political problems? This presentation will explore the relationship between Žižek’s ‘gappy’ ontology and his unique conceptions of freedom, ethics, and love, and so offer an evaluation of the practical implications of Žižek’s ontology.

The Goblet Words of Hamlet: Indirect Communication in Shakespeare And Daoist Zhuangzi

Silvan Rus

University of Queensland

This paper will demonstrate the parallels of Shakespeare’s Hamlet and Daoist philosophy – particularly from the Zhuāngzǐ. The paper will argue for the use of indirect communication in what seems as a neglected mode of sharing ideas in Western philosophical discourse within the context of an ever-changing world. The perspective of the actor in performance will also be adopted in this paper. Zhuāngzǐ calls words that last through changes “goblet words”: words that are adaptive, likening them to a goblet that tips itself once full and stands for filling when empty. The paper will illustrate the political, familial, and psycho-emotional changes throughout the life of Hamlet and the “goblet words” that Shakespeare wields in the play in response to those changes. Alluding to Friedrich Schiller’s warring faculties of ‘form’ and ‘sense’ mediated by the ‘play’ drive, the paper then formulates the ‘infinite in faculty’ that Hamlet refers to in his ‘what a piece of work is a man’ speech according to Chapter 42 of Laozi’s *Dào Dé Jīng*. By

reinterpreting the drives of Schiller into Chinese (Mandarin), the human faculties will be explored through an ekphratic analysis of the Chinese characters. This will further expand into Daoist ideas of creativity, inner-alchemy, wúwéi (no-effort) and wúxīn (no-mind/heart). The paper then refers to the performance practice and philosophy of the Queensland Shakespeare Ensemble under the Artistic Direction of Dr Rob Pensalfini and how it has bred a new type of actor: the 'goblet actor.'

Session 6C

Be A Tosser: Causal Decision Theory and Stable Choice Methods

Timothy Williamson

Australian National University

Causal Decision Theorists are doomed to die, or at least raise their chance of death, in a recent case due to Arif Ahmed (2015): Dicing With Death. I argue that Causal Decision Theory (CDT) actually gets the right answer in Ahmed's case. I show that Ahmed's analysis of CDT goes wrong in at least two places: (i) it misrepresents the available acts, and (ii) it under-describes relevant causal features of the case. Once we correct for both of these misunderstandings, we see that CDT makes a sensible recommendation that causally promotes survival. I conclude with two implications for decision theory more generally. First, we need a more fine-grained analysis of options than is traditionally given. Secondly, CDT's verdict is sensitive to how we causally model the world. I lay out some criteria for selecting a causal model and conclude that the correct causal model (for decision-making purposes) should capture information about causes of your act.

Understanding the Minds of Others

Abdul Latif Mondal

Aligarh Muslim University

As is known, Meditations on First Philosophy is Descartes' most famous philosophical work wherein he deliberately doubts everything to the last degree. Whatever is to be known must be known to be absolute certain. One thing Descartes finds he cannot possibly doubt is that the proposition "I think therefore I exist" is necessarily true whether it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind. Mind itself is understood either as an experience that has the ability to feel pain, pleasure, hunger, etc. Or as the agency that has the ability for self-control, planning, memory, etc. Bertrand Russell used the word 'Qualia' when he talked about the problem of other minds and he says this is a philosophical problem. Now the point is that it is possible to explain everything by materialism and this may be undeniable. But we need to go beyond physics to show something about other minds. We have no way of proving other minds. We need to make some other kind of inference. Bertrand Russell claims we know about them by "Analogy". We can make an analogical inference to know other minds. Because other human beings are like me, in that they behave very much as I do in similar circumstances and are made of the same stuff (for example, if you put a pin on my skin then I feel pain; other people feel similar pain if you put the pin to them). Therefore, I can infer that other people also have consciousness. And if in every case we find of certain behavior is because of having a mind, then when we see this behavior it is possible that the cause of the behavior is due to having a mind, even when we cannot observe the mind of others. So, for example, if the cause of studying Psychology is having a mind, when we see someone studying psychology, we can be sure that they have a mind even if we cannot observe it. We can know our private introspection but we cannot know other people's thoughts or experiences. We can only assume the existence of other minds.

Cognitive Extension Unbounded

Anastasiya Kravchuk

University of Adelaide

The program of extended cognition – particularly its representationalist, information-processing vein – is still troubled by the problem of demarcation: of providing criteria for what should *not* be described as being part of a cognitive system. The difficulty here is to avoid not only the extreme of describing cognition as only that which occurs inside the organism (internalist bias), but also the extreme of describing cognition as that which occurs wherever there is information (cognitive bloat). I maintain that this aversion to cognitive bloat is optional: that it stems less from deep-seated intuition, and more from a desire to describe cognitive systems as decomposable into clearly-bounded parts, to suit the program's tacit (and sometimes explicit) commitment to a mechanistic explanatory strategy. I will review the connections that have been drawn between the constraints of demarcation and decomposability. I will then show that the trend towards describing large, decentralized extended cognitive systems, not well-suited to fulfilling either constraint, is paralleled by a trend, elsewhere in the philosophy of science, towards articulating explanatory strategies that exploit the complexity of non-decomposable systems' structures. I will thus propose that cognition could well be described in terms of the structural properties of undemarcated and non-decomposable information-processing systems.